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The Significance of “Domicile” in Wong
Kim Ark
John C. Eastman
Candidate Trump’s pledge during his 2015–2016 campaign for
President to “End Birthright Citizenship,”1 and President Trump’s
October 2018 assertion in an interview with Axios on HBO that he
could end birthright citizenship by executive order,2 has brought the
dispute over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause3 back to the forefront of our national discourse.
The current perception among many (perhaps most) Americans,
whether they agree with it or think it foolish, is that mere birth on
U.S. soil results in automatic citizenship for the child, no matter the
circumstances of the child’s parents’ presence in the United
States—whether temporary or permanent, lawful, or unlawful. This
common perception is bolstered by majority academic opinion,
which contends that the question was settled by the Supreme Court

 Henry Salvatori Professor of Law & Community Service, and former Dean,
Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law; Senior Fellow at The Claremont
Institute and Founding Director of the Institute’s Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence. This Article was prepared for the Chapman Law Review symposium
honoring the life and work of the late Ron Rotunda, whom I had the privilege of recruiting
to Chapman while I was serving as Dean. One of the things that distinguished Ron in the
legal academy was his willingness to consider new arguments, and the topic here was no
exception. In earlier editions of Ron’s constitutional law treatise, the section on the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause merely conveyed the modern understanding
that mere birth on U.S. soil provided automatic citizenship to the newborn child, but after
I informed him of the significant scholarship indicating that the modern understanding
was contrary to the original understanding of the clause, Ron modified the section,
indicating in a footnote that there were competing scholarly views on the subject.
Compare 3 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 22.3 (1986);
4 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 22.3 (2d ed. 1992);
and 5 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 22.3 (3d ed.
1999), with 6 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 22.3 (4th
ed. 2009). Honest scholarship and debate were Ron’s hallmark, and I am delighted to
present this Article in his memory.
1 Immigration Reform That Will Make America Great Again, TRUMP: MAKE
AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! 1, 4 (2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20151231034321/https://www.
donaldjtrump.com/images/uploads/Immigration-Reform-Trump.pdf [http://perma.cc/D6T4-D7m9].
2 Jonathan Swan & Stef W. Kight, Exclusive: Trump targeting birthright
citizenship with executive order, AXIOS (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.axios.com/trumpbirthright-citizenship-executive-order-0cf4285a-16c6-48f2-a933-bd71fd72ea82.html
[http://perma.cc//TT3C-6R46].
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
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over a century ago in the 1898 Wong Kim Ark case,4 in which the
Court held that a child born on U.S. soil to Chinese parents who
were not citizens (and because of a treaty between the U.S. and
China could not become citizens) was nevertheless a citizen by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.5
I have argued extensively elsewhere—in briefing before the
Supreme Court,6 in legislative testimony,7 in articles both scholarly8
and popular,9 and in numerous media appearances10—why I believe
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
See, e.g., Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A Legislative History, 60 AM. U. L.
REV. 331, 332–33 (2010).
6 See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence In Support of Respondents, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
7 Birthright Citizenship: Is it the Right Policy for America?, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Border Security of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the H.R.,
114th Cong. 13 (2015) (statement of John C. Eastman), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/
JU01/20150429/103384/HHRG-114-JU01-Transcript-20150429.pdf [http://perma.cc/B2EV3LLK]; Birthright Citizenship State Compact Bill: Hearing Before S. Appropri ations
Comm., 50th Sess. (Ariz. Feb. 22, 2011) (statement of John C. Eastman),
https://www.azleg.gov/archivedmeetings/?Year=2011 [http://perma.cc/R7CC-ARJX];
Birthright Citizenship State Compact Bill: Hearing Before S. Judiciary Comm.,
50th Sess, (Ariz. Feb. 7, 2011) (statement of John C. Eastman), https://www.azleg.gov/
archivedmeetings/?Year=2011 [http://perma.cc/R7CC-ARJX]; Dual Citizenship, Birthright
Citizenship, and the Meaning of Sovereignty: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the H.R., 109th Cong. 57–59 (Sept.
29, 2005) (statement of John C. Eastman), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG109hhrg23690/html/CHRG-109hhrg23690.htm [http://perma.cc/6SYZ-U6ED].
8 See generally John C. Eastman, From Plyler to Arizona: Have the Courts Forgotten
About Corfield v. Coryell?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 165 (2013); John C. Eastman & Ediberto
Roman, Debate on Birthright Citizenship, 6 FLA. INT’L U. L. Rev. 293 (2011); John C.
Eastman, Born in the U.S.A.? Re-assessing Birthright Citizenship in the Wake of 9/11, 12
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 167 (2007) (reprinting congressional testimony); John C. Eastman,
From Feudalism to Consent: Rethinking Birthright Citizenship, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar.
30, 2006), https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/feudalism-consent-rethinkingbirthright-citizenship [http://perma.cc/Q4U9-ZVF5].
9 See generally John C. Eastman, Trump is Right on Birthright Citizenship, DAILY
CALLER (Nov. 2, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://dailycaller.com/2018/11/02/trump-right-birthrightcitizenship/ [http://perma.cc/34LK-2RZ3]; John C. Eastman, Revoking birthright
citizenship would enforce the Constitution, N.Y. P OST (Oct. 30, 2018, 6:55 PM),
https://nypost.com/2018/10/30/revoking-birthright-citizenship-would-enforce-the-constitution/
[http://perma.cc/LF3K-XFMK]; John C. Eastman & Linda Chavez, Birthright Citizenship:
Debate, CRB DIGITAL (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/birthrightcitizenship/ [http://perma.cc/P5EG-VZRB]; John C. Eastman, We Can Apply the 14th
Amendment While Also Reforming Birthright Citizenship, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 24, 2015, 8:00 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/08/birthright-citizenship-reform-it-without-repealing14th-amendment/ [http://perma.cc/NF85-QHD9].
10 See, e.g., The California Report: Trump Considers Executive Order to End Birthright
Citizenship (KQED radio broadcast Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.kqed.org/news/11702317/calexicomayor-calls-trumps-response-to-migrant-caravan-alarmist [http://perma.cc/XC7E-BTNP]; Steve
Harman, Bye-Bye Baby: Trump Aims to End Birthright Citizenship, VOICE OF AM. (Oct. 30, 2018,
9:43 AM), https://www.voanews.com/a/trump-aims-to-end-birthright-citizenship/4634978.html
[http://perma.cc/E56D-QESS]; AirTalk Hosted by Larry Mantle: Can Trump end
birthright citizenship – and should it end? (KPCC radio broadcast Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.scpr.org/programs/airtalk/2018/10/30/63847/can-trump-end-birthright-citizenshipand-should-he/ [http://perma.cc/4H82-WKN5]; All Things Considered: Trump Claims He Will
4
5
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the predominate modern understanding of the Citizenship Clause is
incorrect. The short version? The Citizenship Clause actually
contains two components for automatic citizenship: 1) birth on U.S.
soil; and 2) being “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.11
Contrary to the modern understanding, the phrase “subject to the
jurisdiction” is not synonymous with “subject to the laws,” which for
those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment was
merely a partial or territorial jurisdiction. Rather, for them, “subject
to the jurisdiction” meant subject to the “complete” jurisdiction,
“[n]ot owing allegiance to anybody else.”12 In other words, as the
Supreme Court noted when it first addressed the clause in 1872,
just four years after the Amendment’s adoption: “The phrase,
‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its
operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of
foreign States born within the United States.”13
Admittedly, that language in the Supreme Court’s 1872
Slaughter-House decision was not necessary to the case’s holding and
is therefore dicta. But it became a holding a decade later in a case
involving John Elk, a Native American born in the United States
who later renounced his tribal allegiance and claimed citizenship by
virtue of the Citizenship Clause.14 The Supreme Court rejected his
claim, holding that Elk was not at the time of his birth “subject to the
jurisdiction” of the United States, which required that he be “not
merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the
United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction,
End Birthright Citizenship Through Executive Order (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 30, 2018,
4:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/30/662253537/trump-claims-he-will-end-birthrightcitizenship-through-executive-order [http://perma.cc/GC4H-NMS7]; The Larry Elder Show
(KRLA-Salem Radio Network radio broadcast Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.larryelder.com/showarchive/page/6/ [http://perma.cc/P575-DX3R]; The Ingraham Angle (Fox News Channel
television broadcast Oct. 30, 2018), https://video.foxnews.com/v/5855619416001/?#sp=showclips [http://perma.cc/EGV2-5Y3A]; The Dennis Prager Show: Truth vs. Leftism (KRLA-Los
Angeles radio broadcast Nov. 1, 2018), https://pragertopia.com/2018/11/01/prager-20181101-1truth-vs-leftism/ [http://perma.cc/2LLE-W2RX]; James Ho & John C. Eastman, Birthright
Citizenship and the 14th Amendment (C-SPAN television broadcast Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.cspan.org/video/?328772-1/discussion-birthright-citizenship [http://perma.cc/C3Y6-AL8U];
Doug McIntyre Show (WCBS-New York radio broadcast Aug. 20, 2015); McIntyre in the
Morning (KABC-Los Angeles radio broadcast Aug. 20, 2015); On Point, (NPR radio broadcast
Aug. 9, 2010); Interview with Ji-Eun Lee (Munhwa Broadcasting Corp. broadcast Feb. 12,
2009); Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News Channel television broadcast Dec. 14, 2007);
The Paula Zahn Show (CNN television broadcast Dec. 31, 2005). See also Press Conference at
the National Press Club (Aug. 10, 2010) (participating media outlets included Politico, Federal
News Service, Congressional Quarterly, Amnesty International, Fox News, Talk Radio News,
Congressional Quarterly, Center for American Progress, Dallas Morning News, Human
Events, GAO, World Journal, Think Progress, Eagle Forum, and Voice of America).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
12 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2893 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull).
13 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872) (emphasis added).
14 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
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and owing them direct and immediate allegiance”—a test he could
not meet because, at his birth, Elk “owed immediate allegiance” to
this tribe and not to the United States.15
The Citizenship Clause therefore bestowed automatic
citizenship on those born in the United States who were subject
not merely to the partial, territorial jurisdiction applicable to
anyone physically present within our borders (save for diplomats
and invading armies), but who were subject to the complete,
political jurisdiction, in the sense of owing allegiance to the
United States. As Thomas Cooley, the leading treatise writer of
the era, described it, “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United
States “meant full and complete jurisdiction to which citizens are
generally subject, and not any qualified and partial jurisdiction,
such as may consist with allegiance to some other government.”16
That would seem to have settled the matter.
But fourteen years after the decision in Elk, and thirty
years after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court ruled that Wong Kim Ark, who had been born in
1873 to parents of Chinese origin who were still subjects of the
Emperor of China and not U.S. citizens, was a citizen because
he had been born on U.S. soil.17 My goal here is not to revisit
the correctness of that decision, or to review the extensive
evidence that I believe demonstrates that Chief Justice Fuller
had the better of the argument in his dissent, but rather to
focus on one critically important aspect of the case that rather
dramatically limits the scope of the case’s holding (as opposed to
its more expansive dicta) in a way that is directly relevant to
the current dispute about whether the Fourteenth Amendment
mandates automatic citizenship for the children of parents
unlawfully present in the United States.
That critical aspect of the case is the word “domicile,” which
appears twenty-four times in the majority opinion and
introductory statement of facts, and another four times in the
dissent.18 The “question presented,” as stated by Justice Gray,
[I]s whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese
descent, who at the time of his birth are subjects of the emperor of
China, but have a permanent domicile and residence in the United
States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in

Id. at 94, 99, 102.
THOMAS COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 243 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2001) (1880).
17 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653, 704 (1898).
18 The words “resident” or “residence” appear an additional thirty-two times in the
majority opinion, and twelve times in the dissent. See generally id.
15
16
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any diplomatic or official capacity under the emperor of China,
becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by
virtue of the first clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
constitution: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside.”19

The fact that Wong Kim Ark’s parents were “domiciled
residents of the United States” at the time of Wong Kim Ark’s
birth in 1873, “and had established and enjoyed a permanent
domicile and residence therein at said city and county of San
Francisco,” California, was explicitly part of the agreed-upon
facts on which the case had been submitted to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California for decision.20
Justice Gray repeated that factual stipulation at the outset of his
opinion: “They [Wong Kim Ark’s parents] were at the time of his
birth domiciled residents of the United States, having previously
established and are still enjoying a permanent domicile and
residence therein at San Francisco.”21 He also noted, per the
factual stipulation, that Wong Kim Ark, himself,
ever since his birth, has had but one residence, to wit, in California,
within the United States and has there resided, claiming to be a
citizen of the United States, and has never lost or changed that
residence, or gained or acquired another residence; and neither he,
nor his parents acting for him, ever renounced his allegiance to the
United States.22

Although Justice Gray used the word “residence” rather than
“domicile” when describing Wong Kim Ark’s circumstances, it
was (and is) well established, as Justice Joseph Story noted in his
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, that “the place of birth of
a person is considered as his domicil[e], if it is at the time of his
birth the domicil[e] of his parents.”23
“Domicile” is, of course, a legal term of art. According to
Black’s Law Dictionary, it is “[t]hat place in which a man has
voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself and family, not for a
mere special or temporary purpose, but with the present
intention of making a permanent home, until some unexpected
event shall occur to induce him to adopt some other permanent
Id. at 653 (emphasis added).
Id. at 650–51 (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
22 Id.
23 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD
TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS § 46, at 44 (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1834) (emphasis added).
19
20
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home.”24 “It is his legal residence, as distinguished from his
temporary place of abode.”25 “Legal residence” is in turn defined
as “the term applied to the place a person spends most of his time
and is the home that is recognised by law.”26 Or, as the Seventh
Circuit put it in In re Garneau, it is the place where a person
“exercises his political rights.”27
Thus, by repeatedly describing Wong Kim Ark’s parents as
“domiciled” in the United States, the actual holding in the case
addressed only children born in the United States to parents who
are domiciled in the United States, which is to say, have their
“legal residence” in the United States.28
Chief Justice Fuller, joined by Justice Harlan, contested
even this in his dissent.29 Though “domiciled” in the United
States, Wong Kim Ark’s parents (and hence Wong Kim Ark
himself) could not be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United
States in the complete, political sense intended by the
Fourteenth Amendment, he argued, because by treaty they were
not allowed to become citizens but remained “subjects” of the
Emperor of China, to whom they therefore continued to owe
allegiance.30 Whether or not Chief Justice Fuller was correct on
that score (and I contend that he was), the majority opinion could
not extend further than the facts of the case warranted, namely,
that children born to parents who are domiciled in the United
States are sufficiently “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United
States that the Fourteenth Amendment bestows on them
automatic citizenship upon birth.31 As Justice Gray himself noted
when discounting the contrary language in the Slaughter-House
Cases cited above:
[I]t is well to bear in mind the often-quoted words of Chief Justice
Marshall: ‘It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the
24 Domicile, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) (citing In re Garneau, 127 F. 677
(7th Cir. 1904)).
25 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Town of Salem v. Town of Lyme, 29 Conn. 74 (1860)).
26 Legal Residence, THE LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/legal-residence/
[http://perma.cc/5MLZ-FWP7] (emphasis added).
27 In re Garneau, 127 F. at 678.
28 Had Justice Gray considered the full scope of the requirements for “domicile,”
including that it is the place where one exercises “political rights,” he might have realized
that the treaty prohibition on Chinese immigrants exercising political rights would have
prevented them from being deemed “domiciled” in the United States. Nevertheless, the
actual holding of the case is limited to those who are so “domiciled.”
29 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 706–10 (1898) (Fuller,
C.J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 725–26.
31 One could even argue that the actual holding is narrower still, limited to those
domiciled in the United States who were barred by treaty from ever becoming citizens.
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case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case,
they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a
subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision.32

Chief Justice Marshall’s long-standing distinction between
holding and dicta33 is particularly germane in assessing the scope of
Wong Kim Ark’s holding, because language in Justice Gray’s
opinion that appears to apply more broadly than to those domiciled
in the United States is, at times, patently wrong—errors that likely
would have not been made had the precise issue been before the
Court. In one glaring example, Justice Gray quoted Justice Joseph
Story for the proposition that “[p]ersons who are born in a country
are generally deemed citizens and subjects of that country,”34 but
he omitted the very next sentence in Justice Story’s treatise,
namely, that a “reasonable qualification of the rule would seem to
be, that it should not apply to the children of parents, who were in
itinere [traveling] in the country, or who were abiding there for
temporary purposes, as for health, or curiosity, or occasional
business.”35 Although Justice Story acknowledged that “[i]t would
be difficult . . . to assert, that in the present state of public law such
a qualification is universally established,”36 Justice Gray’s omission
of the qualification altogether erroneously implies that the opposite
was universally established.
Justice Story’s caveat directly addresses several of the
modern issues that might well be, but have not previously
been, presented to the Court. Does “subject to the jurisdiction”
cover children born to those who are in the United States
lawfully but only temporarily, such as those on tourist,
student, or work visas (temporary sojourners, to use the
language of the day)? Does it also extend to children born to
those who have overstayed their visas and become unlawfully
present in the United States? And can it possibly also extend
to children born to those who were never lawfully admitted
into the United States in the first place? Honest scholars who
argue for such a broad interpretation of the Citizenship Clause

32 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 679 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 399 (1821)).
33 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000
(1994) (discussing accuracy as being the “primary virtue” for Chief Justice Marshall’s
dicta-holding distinction).
34 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 661 (quoting STORY, supra note 23, § 48).
35 STORY, supra note 23, § 48.
36 Id. Great Britain, for example, did not recognize the qualification that Story
recognized was otherwise nearly universally accepted.
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concede that the Supreme Court has never held that such
individuals are citizens. 37
Another example: Justice Gray claimed that the English
common law rule of jus soli “was in force” not only “in all the
English colonies upon this continent down to the time of the
Declaration of Independence,” as it clearly was, but also “in the
United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the
constitution as originally established.”38 The latter point is
patently erroneous. The English common law rule, accurately
described by Justice Gray, is that:
[E]very person born within the dominions of the crown, no matter
whether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case,
whether the parents were settled, or merely temporarily sojourning,
in the country, was an English subject, save only the children of
foreign ambassadors (who were excepted because their fathers carried
their own nationality with them), or a child born to a foreigner during
the hostile occupation of any part of the territories of England.39

Being an “English subject” also meant under the law of jus soli,
owing “permanent allegiance to the crown.”40 The Declaration of
Independence is not just a thorough repudiation of that old
feudal idea of “permanent allegiance,” but perhaps the most
eloquent repudiation of it ever written.

37 See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Indians and Invaders: The Citizenship Clause and
Illegal Aliens, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 499, 500 n.5 (2008) (noting that the principle that
any child born on U.S. soil (save to diplomats) “does not rest on any judicial holding. It is
based instead on dictum from the Wong Kim Ark case and longstanding practice”); Ronald
Rizzo, Born in the USA but Not A Citizen? How the Birth Visa Can Solve Today’s
Immigration Challenges, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 393, 403 (2014) (“Wong Kim Ark
made absolutely no holding regarding children born to illegal aliens and temporary
visitors on U.S. soil.”); David A. Martin, Membership and Consent: Abstract or Organic?,
11 YALE J. INT'L L. 278, 280-81 (1985) (likewise noting that language in Wong Kim Ark
extending beyond children of lawfully domiciled parents is “dictum”); Katherine Nesler,
Resurgence of the Birthright Citizenship Debate, 55 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 235 (2017)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has not addressed a case directly on whether children born to
undocumented immigrants on United States soil are automatically granted citizenship by
virtue of birth within United States.”); Katherine Pettit, Addressing the Call for the
Elimination of Birthright Citizenship in the United States: Constitutional and Pragmatic
Reasons to Keep Birthright Citizenship Intact, 15 TUL. J. INT’ L & COMP. L. 265, 268 (2006)
(“The Supreme Court has yet to decide specifically whether this principle applies to a
person whose parents are in the United States illegally.”); Alberto R. Gonzales, An
Immigration Crisis in A Nation of Immigrants: Why Amending the Fourteenth
Amendment Won’t Solve Our Problems, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1859, 1868 (2012) (“[T]he
Supreme Court has yet to rule on birthright citizenship or the interpretation of ‘subject to the
jurisdiction’ in the context of a child born in the United States to unauthorized immigrants.”).
38 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 659.
39 Id. at 657 (quoting LORD CHIEF JUSTICE COCKBURN, COCKBURN ON NATIONALITY 7).
40 Id. (quoting A.V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 173–77, 741 (n.p., Sweet & Maxwell 1896).
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The Declaration begins with a statement that it had become
necessary for the American people “to dissolve the political bands
which ha[d] connected them” to the English people.41 It then
asserts as a “self-evident” truth:
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of [the
end of securing the unalienable rights with which the people are
endowed by their Creator], it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them
shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.42

And if it were not clear enough from those two statements that the
Americans were repudiating the notion that they owed perpetual
allegiance to the English crown, the language of the closing
paragraph is unmistakable, declaring that “these United Colonies
are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they
are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all
political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is,
and ought to be totally dissolved . . . .”43 The notion that the English
common law of jus soli therefore continued unabated after the
Declaration of Independence could not be more mistaken.
Much of the evidence Justice Gray marshalled in support of
his conclusion likewise suffers from a lack of care that might not
have been the case had the broader question actually been at
issue. By way of example, Justice Gray cited several cases for the
unobjectionable proposition that “[t]he interpretation of the
[C]onstitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by
the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the
English common law, and are to be read in light of its history.”44
What he failed to mention is that the general rule about using
the common law as a rule of interpretation only applies to the
extent that the common law was compatible with the principles
of the American Revolution. As Justice Story noted in his 1829
opinion in Van Ness v. Pacard, “The common law of England is
not to be taken in all respects to be that of America. Our
ancestors brought with them its general principles, and claimed
it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
Id. at para. 2.
43 Id. at para. 32 (emphasis added).
44 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655 (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478
(1888)); see also id. at 654–55 (citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874);
Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422 (1885); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–25
(1886); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888); and Moore v. United States, 91 U.S.
270, 274 (1875)).
41
42
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only that portion which was applicable to their situation.”45
Indeed, long before Justice Gray treated the common law as an
obligatory and indisputable governing principle in the United States,
the California Supreme Court had much more accurately described
that the rule was just the opposite.46 There was, that court claimed:
[N]o doctrine better settled, than that such portions of the law of
England as are not adapted to our condition, form no part of the law of
this State. This exception includes not only such laws as are
inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions, but such as are framed
with special reference to the physical condition of a country differing
widely from our own. It is contrary to the spirit of the common law
itself to apply a rule founded on a particular reason, to a case where
that reason utterly fails. Cesante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex. [The
reason for a law ceasing, the law itself ceases].47

In short, “[t]he principles of the common law have been
adopted in this country only so far as applicable to the habits and
condition of our society, and in harmony with the genius, spirit,
and objects of our institutions.” 48 They are not applicable
45 Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829); see also Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 52 (1894); Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437, 455 (1850); Murray v. Chi.
& N.W. Ry. Co., 62 F. 24, 27 (1894) (“[W]hen the [C]onstitution of the United States was
adopted, the general rules of the common law, in so far as they were applicable to the
conditions then existing in the colonies, and subject to the modifications necessary to adapt
them to the uses and needs of the people, were recognized and were in force in the colonies
. . . .” (emphasis added)); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 363 (1851) (“The
colonists who established the English colonies in this country, undoubtedly brought with
them the common and statute laws of England, as they stood at the time of their
emigration, so far as they were applicable to the situation and local circumstances of the
colony.” (emphasis added)); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 31–32 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 1999) (1883); 1 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 537 (Fred B. Rothman Publ’ns 1999) (1873) (“[T]he
common law, so far as it is applicable to our situation and government, has been
recognized and adopted, as one entire system, by the constitutions of Massachusetts, New
York, New Jersey, and Maryland. It has been assumed by the courts of justice, or declared
by statute, with the like modifications, as the law of the land in every state. It was
imported by our colonial ancestors, as far as it was applicable . . . .” (emphasis added)).
46 See Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136 (1857).
47 Id. at 142–43 (quoting Starr v. Child, 20 Wend. 149 (N.Y. 1838) (Bronson, J., dissenting)).
48 Pierson v. Lane, 14 N.W. 90, 92 (Iowa 1882); see also, e.g., Ex parte Holman, 28
Iowa 88, 126 (1869) (“The courts of this country unite in holding that the common law, so
far as it is suited to the condition of our people and accords with our institutions, is the
law of the land.” (emphasis added)); Wagner v. Bissell, 3 Iowa 396, 403 (1856) (“[W]here
[the common law] has been varied by custom, not founded in reason, or not consonant to
the genius and manners of the people, it ceases to have force.”); Brief for Respondents at
316, People v. Van Rensselaer, 9 N.Y. 291 (1853) (“There is this necessary limitation
implied [upon adoption of the common law by British subjects in new territories], that
they carry with them all the laws applicable to their situation, and not repugnant to the
local and political circumstances in which they are placed.”); Brief for Plaintiff at 117,
Whitney v. Powell, 2 Pin. 115, 117 (Wis. 1849), 1849 WL 3235, at *2 (“The common law of
England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America.”); Ex parte Hickey, 12
Miss. (4 S. & M.) 751, 776–77 (1845) (“The United States have not taken, in all respects,
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otherwise, and the common law jus soli principle of perpetual and
irrevocable allegiance is simply incompatible with the doctrine of
consent explicated in the Declaration of Independence.
Chief Justice Fuller correctly noted in his dissent this
significant caveat about the general applicability of the common
law in the United States when he stated,
Manifestly, when the sovereignty of the crown was thrown off, and an
independent government established, every rule of the common law, and
every statute of England obtaining in the colonies, in derogation of the
principles on which the new government was founded, was abrogated.49

But Justice Gray chose not to engage him on the point,
simply asserting, without any of the necessary nuance that the
subject deserved (and directly contrary to the express language of
the Declaration of Independence), that the English common law
rule of jus soli was “in force” after the Declaration “and continued
to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.”50
Such manifest errors on matters collateral to the holding of a
case is precisely why John Marshall’s old maxim about dicta is so
important. As Justice Gray himself noted:
The reason of [John Marshall’s] maxim [regarding dicta] is obvious. The
question actually before the court is investigated with care, and
considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to
illustrate it are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their
possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.51

Viewed through that lens, much of the case authority relied
on by Justice Gray is irrelevant to the issues that remain to be
addressed. That “citizenship by birth was the law of the English
colonies in America” and during the time that New York City was
under British occupation during the war—the issue confronted
by the Court in Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor52—tells us nothing
about whether, or the extent to which, the principles of the
Declaration repudiated the common law of jus soli. Indeed,
another aspect of that case, built on the uncertainty about the

the common law of England. So much only of its general principles are claimed and
adopted which is applicable to our situation, institutions and form of government.”);
Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 646 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (noting that the colonists “brought
with them as a birth-right and inheritance, so much of the common law as was applicable
to their local situation and change of circumstances”); Brief for Executor at 205, Gilbert
v. Heirs of Richards, 7 Vt. 203 (1835) (“Such part only of the common law of England, is
adopted here ‘as is applicable to the local situation and circumstances’ of this state.”).
49 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 709 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 658 (majority opinion).
51 Id. at 679 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821)).
52 Id. at 659 (citing Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830)).
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timing of the John Inglis’s birth,53 demonstrates that the rule set
down in the majority opinion in Inglis is just the opposite of that
which was attributed to it by Justice Gray’s dicta. Addressing the
period of time between the Declaration of Independence in July
1776, and the occupation of New York by the British army in
September 1776 (i.e., when the City was “in the United States”
and not under occupation by a foreign army), the Court held:
If born after the 4th of July 1776, and before the 15th of September of
the same year, when the British took possession of New York, his
infancy incapacitated him from making any election for himself, and
his election and character followed that of his father, subject to the
right of disaffirmance in a reasonable time after the termination of his
minority; which never having been done, he remains a British subject,
and disabled from inheriting the land in question.54

The italicized language is inaccurate under the pure form of jus
soli claimed by Justice Gray, for the status of the father is
irrelevant if the child is born on the soil of the sovereign. To
repeat the prior language of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, quoted
by Justice Gray earlier in the opinion:
By the common law of England, every person born within the
dominions of the crown, no matter whether of English or of foreign
parents, and, in the latter case, whether the parents were settled, or
merely temporarily sojourning, in the country, was an English subject,
save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who were excepted
because their fathers carried their own nationality with them), or a
child born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any part of
the territories of England.55

Justice Gray similarly ignored a key component of Justice
Swayne’s decision in U.S. v. Rhodes56 while riding circuit. The
issue in that case was the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act, which, as Justice Swayne noted, provided that
anyone “born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign

53 Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 120–21 (noting that whether John Inglis was born before
or after July 4, 1776 was essential to the Court’s decision).
54 Id. at 126 (emphasis added). Language to the contrary in the concurring opinion of
Justice Johnson was based on the fact that the State of New York had expressly adopted the
common law (including the rule of jus soli), not that the rule applied after the Declaration of
Independence absent any such adoption by the positive law. See id. at 135–36 (Johnson, J.,
concurring) (“By the twenty-fifth article of the constitution of New York of 1777, the common
law of England is adopted into the jurisprudence of the state. By the principles of that law,
the demandant owed allegiance to the king of Great Britain, as of his province of New York.
By the revolution that allegiance was transferred to the state, and the common law declares
that the individual cannot put off his allegiance by any act of his own.”).
55 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 657 (quoting LORD CHIEF JUSTICE COCKBURN,
COCKBURN ON NATIONALITY 7).
56 27 F. Cas. 785, 786 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866).
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power,” was a citizen and therefore able to testify in court.57
Nancy Talbot was, Justice Swayne held, “a citizen of the United
States of the African race, having been born in the United States,
and not subject to any foreign power.”58 His later description of
the common law of jus soli is therefore pure dicta.
Most egregious, though, was Justice Gray’s reliance on the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Benny v. O’Brien59 as
support for his broad claim that “[t]he [F]ourteenth [A]mendment
affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth
within the territory” for all children here born of resident aliens
except diplomats and occupying armies.60 Benny, like Wong Kim
Ark itself, involved parents who were “domiciled” in the United
States,61 and so its holding is likewise limited to that context. But
the New Jersey Supreme Court was also quite explicit in noting
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide automatic
citizenship beyond that. “Two facts must concur” for there to be
automatic citizenship, it held.62 “[T]he person must be born here,
and he must be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
according to the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, which means,
according to the [C]ivil [R]ights [A]ct, that the person born here
is not subject to any foreign power.”63 The two provisions—that
is, the Civil Rights Act and the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment—“by implication concede that there may
be instances in which the right to citizenship does not attach by
reason of birth in this country,” the court stated.64 And contrary
to Justice Gray’s claim, those exceptions involved not just the
children of diplomats or invading armies: “Persons intended to be
excepted are only those born in this country of foreign parents
who are temporarily traveling here, and children born of persons
resident here in the diplomatic service of foreign governments.”65
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that the
phrases “subject to the jurisdiction” and “not subject to any
foreign power” were both intended to exclude temporary visitors
confirms that the phrases meant complete, political jurisdiction,
not a partial, territorial jurisdiction. And it comports with a key
57 Id. at 786 (emphasis added) (quoting An act to protect all persons in the United States
in their civil rights, and to furnish the means for their vindication, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866)).
58 Id. at 785.
59 32 A. 696 (N.J. 1895).
60 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 693.
61 Benny, 32 A. at 696.
62 Id. at 697.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 698 (emphasis added).
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discussion during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment
in the Senate. Shortly after Senator Howard introduced the
language that was to become the Citizenship Clause, Senator
Cowan asked: “Is the child of the Chinese immigrant in
California a citizen [under the language of the proposed
amendment]? Is the child of a Gypsy born in Pennsylvania a
citizen? If so, what rights have they? Have they any more rights
than a sojourner in the United States?”66 Senator Conness
responded that the amendment would grant citizenship to the
children of Chinese living in California and Gypsies living in
Pennsylvania,67 but his response must be read in light of the
distinction that Senator Cowan himself had made between the
Chinese and Gypsies to whom he was referring and “sojourners.” In
other words, by asking whether children of the Chinese and Gypsies
were to be given “more rights than a sojourner,” Senator Cowan was
necessarily referring to Chinese and Gypsies who were not mere
sojourners (temporary visitors), but who were instead permanently
domiciled in the United States and not owing allegiance to any
foreign power. Far from establishing that the Citizenship Clause
guarantees citizenship to everyone born on U.S. soil no matter the
circumstances of their parents, as several scholars have claimed,68
this important colloquy therefore demonstrates just the opposite.
Citizenship would not be limited to white Europeans, as prior
naturalization acts had done, but neither would it be extended to
the children born on U.S. soil to parents who were merely
temporary visitors—sojourners—to the United States.69
This is precisely the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment given by the New Jersey Supreme Court, Justice
Gray’s claims notwithstanding: “The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment,
by the language, ‘all persons born in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ was intended to bring all
races, without distinction of color, within the rule, which, prior to
that time, pertained to the white race,” stated the court.70 It
therefore extended to a child “of alien parents, who at the time of
his birth were domiciled in this country.”71 But it did not extend
66 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866) (emphasis added) (remarks of
Sen. Edgar Cowan).
67 Id. at 2892 (remarks of Sen. John Conness).
68 See, e.g., Epps, supra note 5, at 356; James C. Ho, Defining “American”: Birthright
Citizenship and the Original Understanding of the 14th Amendment, 9 GREEN BAG 367,
368 (2d ed. 2006).
69 In any event, if Senator Conness’s comments can be read to suggest that anyone born
on U.S. soil were to become citizens no matter the circumstances of their parents, it is
significant that none of the other supporters of the Citizenship Clause embraced that position.
70 Benny, 32 A. at 698.
71 Id.
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to “those born in this country of foreign parents who are
temporarily traveling here.”72
The Executive Branch of the federal government likewise
recognized—both before and for two-thirds of a century after the
decision in Wong Kim Ark—that more than mere birth on U.S.
soil was required for the grant of automatic citizenship. With the
exception of wartime, when passports could be issued to
non-citizen members of the military who took an oath of
allegiance,73 only American citizens have been eligible for
passports since 1856, so proof of citizenship has been required
when applying for a passport.74 But shortly after the Court’s
decision in Elk v. Wilkins, the passport office adopted a form for
use by any “native citizen” applying for a passport that required,
inter alia, the following information: 1) city, state, and date of
birth in the United States; 2) whether the father was a native or
naturalized citizen; 3) confirmation that the individual was
domiciled in the United States, including the city and state of
permanent residence; and 4) an oath of allegiance to the United
States.75 Information about the father’s status continued until it
was inexplicably dropped as a requirement in 1967.76 If birth on
United States soil alone was sufficient for citizenship, the
information about the father’s citizenship status would not have
been necessary.
Similarly, as Chief Justice Fuller noted in his Wong Kim Ark
dissenting opinion, Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen
rendered an opinion in 1885 that a child born on U.S. soil to Saxon
parents who were “temporarily in the United States” was not a
citizen because, through his parents, he was subject to a foreign
power.77 Moreover, Frederick Frelinghuysen’s successor as
Secretary of State, Thomas Bayard, rendered the same opinion in
Id.
An Act For enrolling and calling out the national Forces, and for other Purposes,
ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 731, 731 (1863) (exempting from the citizen requirement foreign-born
males between the ages of twenty and forty-five “who shall have declared on oath their
intention to become citizens” and who were therefore obligated to military service by An
Act for enrolling and calling out the national Forces, and for other Purposes).
74 An Act To regulate the Diplomatic and Consider Systems of the United States, ch.
127, § 23, 11 Stat. 52, 60–61 (1856).
75 GAILLARD HUNT, THE STATE DEP’T, THE AMERICAN PASSPORT: ITS HISTORY AND A
DIGEST OF LAWS, RULINGS, AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING ITS ISSUANCE BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE 64 (Wash., Gov’t Printing Office 1898).
76 See 22 C.F.R. § 33.23 (1938) (requiring for “native citizen” applications, inter alia,
“the name, date and place of birth, and place of residence of the applicant’s father”); but
see 22 C.F.R. § 51.43 (1967) (requiring only proof of birth in the United States).
77 Frederick Frelinghuysen, Hausding’s Case: Frelinghuysen, Sec’y of State, to
Kasson, 1885, 2 Wharton’s Digest 399 (1885) in CASES AND OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 222–23 (Boston, The Bos. Book Co. 1893).
72
73
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Richard Greisser’s case. Greisser was born in Ohio in 1867 to a
father who was a German subject and domiciled in Germany.78
Greisser was therefore not a citizen, according to Secretary of
State Bayard, because he was “‘subject to a foreign power,’ and
‘not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.’”79
In sum, the distinction between sojourners and those
permanently domiciled in the United States was made during the
debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, in state court judicial
opinions, and by the actual practice of the passport office. These
distinctions indicate that the mandate of automatic citizenship
was not understood to apply to children of temporary visitors to
the United States. Of course, if the Citizenship Clause does not
mandate automatic citizenship for children born to parents who
are temporarily, but lawfully, visiting the United States, it
necessarily does not extend citizenship to the children of those
who are unlawfully visiting the United States. In both cases, the
parents are subject only to the partial, territorial jurisdiction of
the United States in the sense that they must comport with the
laws while physically present within the borders of the United
States. But they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States in the broader sense intended by the Fourteenth
Amendment because they are not subject to the complete,
political jurisdiction. For their temporary sojourn to the territory
of the United States brings with it only a temporary obligation to
obey her laws, not a full allegiance to her sovereignty.
One might well argue that even children whose parents are
“domiciled” in the United States, but who remain subjects or
citizens of a foreign power, do not meet the test of the Citizenship
Clause as it was originally understood, and that even the more
limited holding of Wong Kim Ark was therefore incorrect. But it
should be acknowledged that the treaty between the United States
and the Emperor of China that gave rise to the Wong Kim Ark
case was ignoble because it refused to afford to Chinese subjects
the same inalienable right to reject their prior allegiance that
Americans had claimed as an unalienable, natural right in 1776.80
Perhaps Justice Gray was doing no more than counter-balancing
the pernicious effects of that treaty, acknowledging that because
Chinese parents who had become lawfully and permanently
domiciled in the United States had demonstrated their allegiance
to their adopted country as much as the treaty allowed them to do,
78 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 719 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting)
(internal citation omitted).
79 Id. (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
80 See id. at 701–02.
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any children born to them on U.S. soil should enjoy the benefits of
citizenship. But that concern no longer exists—“Cessante Ratione
Legis, Cessat Ipsa Lex” (the reason for a law ceasing, the law itself
ceases).81 Thus, to extend the mandate of automatic citizenship to
the entirely different context of temporary visitors, and even
further to the context of those who have entered this country
illegally, pushes well beyond any such sentiment, and certainly
beyond the actual holding of Wong Kim Ark.

81

Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136 (1857).
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